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A crucial aspect of the human mind is the ability to project the self along the time line to
past and future. It has been argued that such self-projection is essential to re-experience
past experiences and predict future events. In-depth analysis of a novel paradigm investi-
gating mental time shows that the speed of this ‘‘self-projection” in time depends logarith-
mically on the temporal-distance between an imagined ‘‘location” on the time line that
participants were asked to imagine and the location of another imagined event from the
time line. This logarithmic pattern suggests that events in human cognition are spatially
mapped along an imagery mental time line. We argue that the present time-line data
are comparable to the spatial mapping of numbers along the mental number line and that
such spatial maps are a fundamental basis for cognition.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Where were you on your last birthday? What where you doing while hearing about September 11? What did you eat
last night for dinner? Your life is the events you experience (deVries & Watt, 1996; Schroots & Assink, 2005; Schroots, van
Dijkum, & Assink, 2004). The conscious re-experience of yourself at these speciﬁc moments, so-called ‘‘episodic” memory,
is believed to be a neurocognitive system, distinct from other memory systems, that enables human beings to remember
past events (Tulving, 1984, 2002). It was argued that episodic thinking is crucial not only for the ability to ‘‘project” one’s
self mentally in time in order to re-experience the past, but also to pre-experience the future (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Sch-
acter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott,
2007; Tulving, 2002). In addition, recent studies showed that the temporal-distance (TD) between one’s self-location in
time to an event (‘‘how long ago” an event occurred; TD-effect) is also associated with the ability to ‘‘project” oneself men-
tally to a moment in past or future, rather than the mere storage of that actual event as in episodic memory (‘‘when and
what”) (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997; Spreng & Levine, 2006). However, it is not known what role such TD effects play in the
cognitive processing of the mental time. Here, we analyzed TD effects during the re-experiencing and pre-experiencing of
own life events.. All rights reserved.
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In order to investigate the potential role of TD effects in the mental time, we performed an in-depth analysis of a recent
data set on self-projection in mental time (Arzy, Molnar-Szakacs, & Blanke, 2008) obtained in Lausanne, Switzerland in sum-
mer 2007. In different conditions, 14 healthy university graduates participants (seven males, aged 29–38 years; mean ± SD,Fig. 1. (A) Participants were presented with different events that could either happen in the past (obtaining car license, September 11) or are previewed to
happen in the future (probable use of daily medications, birth of ﬁrst child). From the present time (red) as well as from past (blue) and future (green) self-
location in time they had to judge if these events already happened or not. (B–D) Reaction times are plotted here as function of the temporal-distance
between the presented event and the imagined self-location in time (error-bars show the standard error of the mean). This analysis shows a logarithmic
decreasing dependence of reaction times on temporal-distance. This pattern was independent of the imagined time-point showing similar patterns for past
and future events. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
R2 and blog weights for the logarithmic regressor in a multiple regression analysis in each condition. Both reaction times (RTs) vs. log-transformed temporal-
distance (TD) and log-transformed RTs vs. log-transformed TD are given. Signiﬁcance (p) values are given as well as standard error (SE) of the mean.
Relative past Relative future
R2 b (SE) R2 b (SE)
RT vs. Log |TD|
Past .63 99.86 (18.54)*** .84 147.16 (17.45)***
Now .58 77.08 (15.90)*** .72 68.82 (11.47)***
Future .66 136.68 (23.88)*** .47 92.50 (26.17)**
Log RT vs. Log |TD|
Past .61 .09 (.02)*** .83 .14 (.02)***
Now .47 .09 (.02)*** .70 .08 (.01)***
Future .60 .17 (.03)*** .42 .08 (.03)**
** p<.01,
*** p<.001.
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(past), or 10 years ahead (future). They were then presented with different life events (either personal life events or world
history events (Rappaport, Enrich, & Wilson, 1985)) (Fig. 1A) appearing as two-words phrases on a computer screen (for de-
tailed experimental procedure see (Arzy et al., 2008)). Participants were asked to indicate if these events took place before
(relative-past) or after (relative-future) the imagined self-location in time (Fig. 1A). We reported previously that reaction
times (RTs) and accuracy were similar in the past and future conditions (1135.6 ± 46.7 ms and 1137.6 ± 46.4 ms, respec-
tively) but slower and less accurate than in the now condition (1073.6 ± 49.3 ms). Moreover, participants were always faster
and more accurate for relative-future (1103.6 ± 45.1 ms) than for relative-past (1129.6 ± 49.9 ms). Here we investigate the
relation between reaction times and TD in mental time.
In an in-depth analysis we investigated whether RTs varied as a function of the TD between imagined and experienced
event. This was done for personal life events as well as world history events (Rappaport et al., 1985). For each condition (past,
now and future), the presented events (120 events for each condition) were classiﬁed for each participant according to the
TD (in years) between her imagined self-location in time and the time of the event. A linear regression model was not found
to represent the participants’ RTs. Rather, in all conditions, regardless of one’s imagined self-location in time (past, now or
future) a regression equation of the of the participants’ RTs as a function of the log-transformed absolute value of TD showed
a negative coefﬁcient (Table 1; Fig. 1B–D), and RT distributions were positively skewed. Statistical pairwise comparison of RT
distributions using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test did not show any signiﬁcant difference, suggesting similar distributions of
the log-transformed RTs over conditions. Accordingly, for all conditions, Pearson product moment correlation analysis of the
log-transformed TD revealed a signiﬁcant negative correlation between participants’ RTs and the TD of both personal and
world events (after log-transforming of TD: all r’s > .64, p’s < .01; Log-transformed RTs and log-transformed TD: all
r’s > .63, p’s < .01; Correlation of the non-transformed data did not reach signiﬁcance: all r’s > .43, p’s < .1). We note that this
was found for relative-past and relative-future events and thus independent of what time period our participants were asked
to imagine as the experimental present time. These behavioral data show that – independently of the imagined self-location
in time (past, present, or future) – RTs to life events logarithmically depend on the TD between the imagined self-location in
time and the presented life event, demonstrating that TDmay play a larger role in self-projection in mental time and episodic
thinking (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997; Schroots & Assink, 2005; Schroots et al., 2004; Spreng & Levine, 2006) as previously
thought (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Arzy et al., 2008; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Schacter & Addis,
2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007).
3. Discussion
RTs were found to be longer for past and future self-locations in time than in the now self-location. Seminal work regarded
mental timeas ‘‘episodic thinking”– a combinationof self-related episodicmemory recall and episodic future imagination (Ad-
dis et al., 2007; Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Okuda et al., 2003; Schroots & Assink, 2005; Tulving, 1984, 2002), whereasmore recent
authors proposed thatmental time can be seen as ‘‘self-projection” in time, similarly to ‘‘self-projection” in space, emphasizing
the role of visuo-spatial perspective taking, spatial navigation, andmental imagery inmental time (Arzy et al., 2008; Buckner &
Carroll, 2007;Hassabis,Kumaran,Vann,&Maguire, 2007). The current results support the latterproposal, as ‘‘self-projection” in
time was found to be similar to past and future, and different from the now where judgements do not involve such ‘‘self-pro-
jection” in time.
Logarithmic curves were previously shown to ﬁt the relation between TD and memory retention, as logarithmic curves
characterize the distribution of the correct recall of events from different points in time (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997; Spreng
& Levine, 2006). Our data extend these data by showing that cognitive performance (RT with respect to events) was decreas-
ing logarithmically as TDs to the events increased. Moreover, both abovementioned studies investigated the TD effect for
different events from the present time. This was different in the present study as we asked our participants to also imagine
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when a human imagines himself to be located at another self-location in time, either in past or future. Thus, an event that
occurred 12 years ago required a shorter RT when retained from the future or the now self-location in time (as its TD is 22 or
12 years from the experiencer imagined self-location in time). However, if retained from the past, the same event required a
longer RT, as its TD from the imagined self-location in time is now only 2 years. Our results therefore suggest that similar
mechanisms that relate events in different TDs to the present time are used to re-map these events with respect to the imag-
ined self-location in time (Maylor, Chater, & Brown, 2001). This behavioural pattern also shows that participants did not use
mental calculation strategy in order to solve the task as for given events simpler calculations (i.e. closer to one’s self-location
in time) require longer reaction time. Mental calculation should have led to the opposite effect. In addition, while asked to
use a mental calculation strategy and not self-projection in time, none of the participants (in a small separate experiment in
ﬁve subjects) was able to perform the task in the given interstimulus interval of 2000 ms. This shows that mental calculation
cannot account for the behavioural results recorded in the mental-time task. We therefore propose that humans automat-
ically represent different events as well as their own self-location in time on a ‘‘mental time line”. On this mental time-line
facility of access to these events is changing with the change of the subject’s imagined self-location in time.
Our ﬁndings may also relate to logarithmic scaling observed when performing numerical calculations. Thus, experiments
on mental number scaling in archaic cultures, children, and adults have revealed the mapping of numbers along a logarith-
mic scale (Banks & Hill, 1974; Dehaene & Cohen, 1995; Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008; Siegler & Booth, 2004). As this
logarithmic scaling of numbers suggested that humans are mapping numbers onto space on a so-called ‘‘mental number
line” (Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, & Tsivkin, 1999), the logarithmic scale found in our data on mental time might hint
on similar mechanism of spatial mapping for the processing of mental time. Our data suggest that such a spatial mapping
may also be present during processing of events in different TDs from one’s actual or imagined self-location on such a time
line. Hence, we propose the term ‘‘mental time line” to capture that humans spatially map events in real and imagined past
and future on an imagined time line. Self-projection in time (Buckner & Carroll, 2007) might then be perceived as imagining
oneself located in a speciﬁc point on such a mental time line. Finally, this similarity between mental time and mental num-
ber is also supported by neuroimaging studies, as both kinds of studies identify underlying brain mechanisms in inferior
parietal cortex (Addis et al., 2007; Arzy et al., 2008; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Dehaene & Cohen, 1995; Dehaene et al.,
1999; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009).
We conclude that when imagining time and their own and other life events, humans do not only retrieve or predict when
events have occurred or will occur, but also automatically ‘‘project” themselves as well as different events on an imagined
mental time line. Processing of these events depends logarithmically on the TD between these events and the actual or imag-
ined self-location in time of the subject who is experiencing them. Shared logarithmic effects in mental time and mental
number suggest similar, and potentially more elementary, spatial mechanisms to underlie both these cognitive faculties.
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